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In this brief note, we review and extend existing limitations on information-theoretically (IT)
secure quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE). The essential ingredient remains Nayak’s
bound, which provides a tradeoff between the number of homomorphically implementable functions
of an IT-secure QHE scheme and its efficiency. Importantly, the bound is robust to imperfect IT-
security guarantees. We summarize these bounds in the context of existing QHE schemes, and
discuss subtleties of the imposed restrictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fully homomorphic encryption is one of the great ad-
vances of modern cryptography. First discovered by Gen-
try in 2009 [1], it allows one to delegate the processing of
encrypted information to a party without access to the
secret key. In classical computing, an enormous body of
work has gone into developing and optimizing this pro-
tocol (see [2] for a summary).
As the development of large scale quantum computers
progresses, we must consider the cryptographic conse-
quences of their arrival. While quantum computers can
bolster the security of some cryptographic protocols [3],
they can also obviate the security of others [4]. Fortu-
nately, the security of existing homomorphic encryption
schemes is derived from hard problems on lattices [5, 6],
which are expected to be computationally infeasible for
quantum computers to solve. Nonetheless, it is natural
to ask:
Can quantum computers allow for fully homomorphic
encryption schemes which exhibit information-theoretic,
rather than computational, security?
For the strongest security definitions, we review why
the answer is no while expanding on the limitations ap-
pearing in [7–10].
II. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
A. Classical homomorphic encryption
A (classical) homomorphic encryption scheme is typ-
ically defined as an asymmetric key encryption scheme
with an additional functionality, called evaluation. This
functionality allows a third party, in possession of a
ciphertext, to meaningfully manipulate the underlying
plaintext without possessing the secret key. Formally, a
homomorphic encryption scheme HE is a four-tuple of
(randomized) algorithms.
HE.KeyGen(1κ, 1L) = (pk, sk, evk). A key gen-
eration algorithm that accepts security parameter
κ and evaluation parameter L. It outputs the pub-
lic key pk and secret key sk which depend on κ.
Additionally, it outputs a third key known as the
evaluation key evk, which depends on L. This key
assists with the additional evaluation functionality.
HE.Enc(m, pk) = c. An encryption algorithm
that accepts a public key pk and a single bit plain-
text m, and then outputs a ciphertext c. By slight
abuse of notation, we also allowm to be a bit string,
and assume the algorithm performs encryption bit-
by-bit.
HE.Dec(c, sk) = m. A decryption algorithm that
accepts a single ciphertext c and secret key sk and
outputs a single bit plaintext m. Again, we allow
multi-ciphertext inputs and assume decryption oc-
curs bitwise.
HE.Eval(C, (c1, . . . , cn), evk) = c
′. An evaluation
algorithm that accepts a circuit C with n input
wires. It further accepts n ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cn)
and an evaluation key evk. It outputs a single new
ciphertext c′.
The encryption scheme HE should satisfy the usual
properties of any encryption scheme, but should further
satisfy the following homomorphic property. For some
circuits C which we call the permissible functions of the
scheme, we have the following commutative diagram.
M C
M C
HE.Enc(·,pk)
C HE.Eval(C,·,evk)
HE.Dec(·,sk)
Here,M is the space of valid plaintexts (i.e. all binary
strings), and C is the space of valid ciphertexts. One
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2can think of the data processing as occurring from top-
to-bottom, and the encryption as occurring from left-to-
right. Plainly, a party Alice can perform the computation
of C herself, or outsource the computation by sending an
encrypted message to a third party Bob.
We further call a homomorphic encryption scheme
compact if the complexity of HE.Dec is independent
of the function being evaluated. This precludes trivial
schemes in which Bob simply sends back a description of
the circuit to be evaluated, and the true evaluation func-
tion is embedded into the decryption itself. Here and
throughout, we will only consider compact schemes.
We call a homomorphic encryption scheme leveled fully
homomorphic if the set of permissible functions of the
scheme is the set of all circuits up to some size specified
by the evaluation parameter L. We simply call a scheme
fully homomorphic if the set of permissible functions is
the set of all circuits, independent of L.
Typically, the ciphertexts in homomorphic encryption
schemes experience an accumulation of noise that scales
with the evaluated circuit depth. Eventually, this noise
will prevent accurate decryption, and this motivates the
definition of leveled fully homomorphic schemes. It is
important to note that Alice’s work may scale with the
circuit to be evaluated, but this is realized implicitly as
preprocessing in the key generation phase. A bootstrap-
ping procedure introduced in [1] allows for the indefinite
refreshing of noisy ciphertexts, but requires a stronger
circular security assumption.
Additionally, homomorphic encryption schemes some-
times allow for some small probability of failure. To sim-
plify the discussion, we demand that schemes are per-
fectly correct, but note that we can extend all our argu-
ments to the imperfect case with some extra notational
baggage [10].
B. IT-secure quantum homomorphic encryption
In [11], the problem of extending homomorphic encryp-
tion to the quantum setting was considered. Quantum
homomorphic encryption accomplishes a similar task to
classical homomorphic encryption, but with some key dif-
ferences. Formally, we can model QHE as three families
of quantum channels parametrized by the input size n
acting on four Hilbert spaces: HM the message space,
HK the key space, HC the ciphertext space, and HE the
evaluated ciphertext space (see Figure 1).
Focusing on IT-secure encryption, we define a symmet-
ric key QHE scheme. Formally, it consists of the following
families of channels.
QHE.Encn : L(HM ) −→ L(HK ⊗ HC). An en-
cryption isometry that accepts an input state |ψ〉
and then outputs a key ρk ∈ L(HK) and a cipher-
text ρc ∈ L(HC) which includes an appended eval-
uation key [12].
Encn
EvalUn
Decn|ψ〉 U |ψ〉HM
HK
HC HE
HM
FIG. 1: A diagram of QHE matching the generality of
the model in [9]. Usually, we take HC = HE .
QHE.Decn : L(HK ⊗ HC) −→ L(HM ). A de-
cryption channel that accepts a key ρk ∈ L(HK)
and evaluated ciphertext ρe ∈ L(HE), and returns
a plaintext state ρm ∈ L(HM ).
QHE.EvalUn : L(HC) −→ L(HE). An evaluation
channel for a unitary circuit U with n wires that
accepts a ciphertext state ρc ∈ HC and outputs
an evaluated ciphertext state ρe ∈ HE . Usually
HC = HE , but this is not required.
Notice that the security parameter κ, which deter-
mines the length of secret key and encoding size, does
not appear explicitly. Since quantum IT-secure encryp-
tion must obey similar key length bounds as classical
IT-secure encryption [13], the key length must grow as a
function of the input for fixed security guarantees. Con-
sequently, for a particular QHE scheme, we define κ im-
plicitly as some fixed polynomial of n. Furthermore, en-
cryption is performed all at once, rather than bit-by-bit.
For leveled schemes, we similarly define the evalu-
ation parameter L as another fixed polynomial of n,
and assume that the evaluation key is appended to the
ciphertext. This differs only slightly from the usual
computationally-secure QHE setup [11], but removes the
need for explicit key generation.
The homomorphic property of the scheme is defined
analogously to the classical setting. There, homomor-
phic evaluation is usually defined piece-by-piece for the
gates comprising a circuit. For universal gate sets, such
as {AND,OR} or {NAND}, homomorphic evaluation of
these constituent gates can be built into (leveled) FHE
schemes. For QHE schemes, the set of permissible func-
tions is augmented by a richer set of constituent gates.
The definitions for compact and homomorphicity carry
over analogously to the quantum setting.
III. QHE PROPOSALS
A. Computationally secure proposals
Computationally secure QHE was first considered in
[11], along with an appropriate generalization of CPA se-
curity. The authors proposed three QHE schemes. The
3first was a scheme that could homomorphically imple-
ment the set of Clifford circuits, and followed directly
from the quantum one-time pad. The second was a quasi-
compact scheme: its decryption function scaled quadrat-
ically only in the number of T -gates of the circuit. The
final scheme required an evaluation key size scaling su-
perexponentially in the T -depth of the circuit, and so was
restricted to efficiently evaluating circuits of constant T -
depth.
More recently, [14] proposed a scheme built off of pre-
vious work on instantaneous nonlocal computation [15].
The scheme is centered around an evaluation key con-
sisting of T -gadgets, which allows for the homomorphic
evaluation of one T -gate per T -gadget. This provides a
leveled quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme
for polynomial-sized circuits, as these are the circuits
for which the evaluation key can be generated efficiently.
This was further extended to a verifiable scheme in [16].
Very recently, a scheme was proposed for performing
leveled QFHE with a purely classical client using en-
tirely different means [17]. This scheme is built on an
encrypted controlled-not function, which allows a server
to apply the control-not gate blindly, i.e. without know-
ing whether they had or not. The function requires a
classical HE scheme with a particular list of desiderata.
Whether or not this constitutes a non-leveled scheme de-
pends on whether one accepts the circular security of
existing schemes satisfying these requirements.
One common thread throughout all of these propos-
als is that each is built on a classical FHE scheme, and
so inherits its underlying computational security. It is
natural to ask if quantum mechanics might allow for an
information-theoretically secure delegation of computa-
tion on encrypted information. To this end, we might be
encouraged by the construction of universal blind compu-
tation [18], which allows delegated BQP quantum compu-
tation that guarantees information-theoretically secure
hiding of both the plaintext and the computation, at the
expense of interaction between Alice and Bob.
B. Information-theoretically secure proposals
There have been several works aimed towards homo-
morphic encryption with information-theoretic security
guarantees. In [19], a homomorphic encryption scheme
based on bosonic encodings was proposed. This scheme
used a weaker version of information-theoretic security
by bounding the information accessible by the adversary.
This allowed them to realize a fully unitary group of per-
missible functions, although these were not universal as
the dimension of the group scaled polynomially in the
input size.
Later, [20] proposed a homomorphic encryption
scheme based off of randomized quantum codes and
transversal gates. The permissible functions for this
scheme included all Clifford circuits augmented by a con-
stant number of T -gates. The security guarantees for this
scheme were stronger, providing exponential suppression
on the trace distance between any two ciphertexts.
More recently, [8] detailed a scheme based on the quan-
tum one-time pad to implement the class of IQP circuits
homomorphically. Their scheme offers similarly strong
information-theoretic security guarantees.
Finally, [21] proposed a homomorphic encryption
scheme with a limited class of operations and mod-
est information-theoretic security claims, but which may
be implemented on current optical technologies. For a
broader survey of securely delegated quantum comput-
ing, see [22].
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON
INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY SECURE
PROPOSALS
We now elaborate on certain no-go theorems which
limit the capacity of homomorphic encryption schemes
to exhibit meaningful information-theoretic security. It
is well-known that in the classical setting, perfect
information-theoretically secure homomorphic encryp-
tion is impossible [23]. This follows from communica-
tion bounds established for perfectly secure single-server
private information retrieval [24], and their relaxations
[25].
The first restriction on QHE information-theoretic se-
curity was proven in [9]. There, they use a data localiza-
tion argument via the no-programming theorem [26] to
show the following.
Theorem 1 (Yu, Perez-Delgado, Fitzsimons). Suppose
that a QHE scheme implements a set of unitary permis-
sible functions S, with precisely zero mutual information
between the plaintext and ciphertext. Then, the size of
the evaluated ciphertext must be of size at least log2(|S|).
When S is the set of all classical reversible functions,
this becomes
log2((2
n)!) = (n− log2(e))2n +O(n).
Thus, in the case of perfect information-theoretic secu-
rity, any QHE scheme implementing even just classical
reversible unitaries must be highly inefficient. It is impor-
tant to note that this data localization technique bounds
the efficiency of perfect IT-secure QHE for any set of
unitary permissible functions.
In spite of this limitation, we have mentioned sev-
eral QHE schemes [8, 19, 20] that implement large
sets of permissible functions with strong, but imper-
fect, information-theoretic security guarantees. As the
information localization argument of [9] relies integrally
on perfect information-theoretic security, several authors
[9, 20, 27] have asked whether an -relaxation of the IT-
security guarantee may allow for much larger sets of per-
missible functions. Theorem 2 resolves this question in
the negative.
4Theorem 2. Suppose a QFHE scheme satisfies, for all
ciphertexts ρ, ρ′,
‖ρ− ρ′‖Tr ≤ 
for some  < 1. Then the communication complexity of
the scheme must be exponential in n.
This theorem appeared concurrently in the appendix
of [7], where it was used to prove bounds on transversal
gates for quantum codes, and in [8], which used sim-
ilar generalizations of single-server private information
retrieval bounds to the quantum setting [10]. At the
heart of these arguments is an application of Nayak’s
bound [28], which places limitations on the compression
of classical information into quantum information in the
context of quantum random access codes. We now ex-
tend Theorem 2 to more closely generalize Theorem 1 to
the imperfect security setting by considering a straight-
forward modification of Nayak’s original bound.
Definition 3. An (n,m, p)-quantum random access code
(QRAC) is a mapping of n classical bits into m qubits,
[b 7→ ρb], along with a set of POVM’s {M0i ,M1i }ni=1 sat-
isfying, for all b ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n],
Tr(M bii ρb) ≥ p.
Informally, this is simply a compression of classical in-
formation into quantum information that allows for a lo-
cal recovery with some probability of success. Nayak’s
bound then places a fundamental limitation on the re-
coverability of this compression [28]. For Theorem 6,
we will require a small generalization of the bound for
QRACs encoding subsets of strings of length n.
Lemma 4. Let F ⊆ {0, 1}n. For each x ∈ F , define a
classical-to-quantum encoding x 7→ ρx, where each ρx is a
state on m qubits. Suppose there exists a set of POVM’s
{M0i ,M1i }ni=1 satisfying, for all x ∈ F and i ∈ [n],
Tr(Mxii ρx) ≥ p.
Let H(·) denote the binary entropy function. Then,
m ≥ log |F | − n ·H(p).
Proof. The proof follows from the original proof of
Nayak’s bound, but with the uniform distribution on F
rather than {0, 1}n.
For any x ∈ {0, 1}∗, define
Fx = {y ∈ F |y is prefixed by x},
and let σx =
1
|Fx|
∑
y∈Fx ρy. For 0 ≤ k < n and for any
x ∈ {0, 1}k such that |Fx| > 0, we then have
σx =
|Fx0|
|Fx| σx0 +
|Fx1|
|Fx| σx1.
Let Xx be a random variable drawn from the uniform
distribution on F conditioned on the first k bits being x,
and let Y x be a binary random variable obtained from a
measurement of σx. Then by Holevo’s theorem [29],
S(ρx) ≥ |Fx0||Fx| S(σx0) +
|Fx1|
|Fx| S(σx1) + I(X
x : Y x).
If the probability of failure of correctly identifying a sam-
ple σx0 or σx1 conditioned on knowing the prefix x is at
most 1− p, then we can apply Fano’s inequality [30],
I(Xx : Y x) ≥ H
( |Fx0|
|Fx|
)
−H(p).
We can then expand the bound for S(σ) out into single-
tons ρy so that,
S(σ) ≥ 1|F |
∑
y∈F
S(ρy) +
n−1∑
k=0
∑
x∈{0,1}k
|Fx|
|F |
(
H
( |Fx0|
|Fx|
)
−H(p)
)
≥
n−1∑
k=0
∑
x∈{0,1}k
|Fx|
|F | H
( |Fx0|
|Fx|
)
− n ·H(p)
≥
n−1∑
k=0
H(Xk+1|X1,...,k)− n ·H(p)
≥ H(X)− n ·H(p)
where the final line follows from the chain rule on con-
ditional entropy. Since X is the uniform distribution on
|F | elements and S(σ) is at most m, the result follows.
With this lemma in mind, we can extend the definition
of a QRAC to include encodings of subsets of strings, and
refer to such encodings as (F, n,m, p)-QRACs, where F
is a subset of {0, 1}n. Applying the lemma with F =
{0, 1}n, we obtain Nayak’s bound [28].
Theorem 5 (Nayak). Any (n,m, p)-quantum random
access code must satisfy
m ≥ n(1−H(p)).
We now have the tools required to prove the extended
imperfect IT-secure QFHE no-go theorem. The central
idea is to extract a quantum random access code from
an IT-secure QHE scheme, and then apply Lemma 4 to
lower bound the communication complexity.
Theorem 6. Suppose we have a QHE scheme whose per-
missible functions can be used to evaluate a set Fn of
Boolean functions on n bits. Suppose further that, for
any two ciphertexts ρ, ρ′ encrypting messages of n bits,
we have the -IT security guarantee
‖ρ− ρ′‖Tr ≤ (n).
Then, the communication complexity of the protocol is at
least log |Fn| − 2n ·H((n)).
5Proof. Throughout, we will use subscripts to denote the
subsystem(s) on which an operator acts. Fix any n ≥ 1.
For any x ∈ {0, 1}n, define the state ρxKM =
QHE.Encn(|x〉). This is pure as QHE.Enc is an isom-
etry. Furthermore, because ρxM purifies to a state of
dimension at most 2 dim(HM ), we may assume that
dim(HK) ≤ dim(HM ).
By our IT-security guarantee, we have that for all x, x′,
‖ρxM − ρx
′
M‖Tr ≤ (n).
By the Schmidt decomposition, there must exist a uni-
tary UK so that
‖UKρxKMU†K − ρx
′
KM‖Tr ≤ (n).
Fix any base point x′ and define UxK to be an operator
that satisfies the above equation.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any Boolean function in Fn.
To be explicit, we may assume f is a classical reversible
permissible function restricted to the first output wire,
without loss of generality. Consider f as a length 2n bit
string with bit i = f(ibinary). Then we can define the
classical-to-quantum encoding f 7→ ρf according to
ρf = QHE.Eval
Uf
n (ρ
x′
KM )
where Uf is the unitary representing the full reversible
circuit for f .
Furthermore, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, we may define the
measurement channel
Mx(·) = MZ1 ◦QHE.Decn ◦ UxK(·)Ux†K
where MZ1 is a Z-basis measurement on the first qubit.
We claim that this forms a (S, 2n,dim(HC) +
dim(HE), 1− (n))-QRAC. To see this, note that
Mx(ρf ) = MZ1 ◦QHE.Decn ◦ UxK(QHE.EvalUfn (ρx
′
KM ))U
x†
K
= MZ1 ◦QHE.Decn ◦ (QHE.EvalUfn (UxKρx
′
KMU
x†
K )
≈(n) MZ1 ◦QHE.Decn ◦ (QHE.EvalUfn (ρxKM ))
≈(n) f(x),
where ≈(n) denotes (n) proximity in terms of trace dis-
tance.
In the above, the second line follows from the fact that
evaluation is performed on the ciphertext alone, and so
commutes with the keyspace unitary. The third line fol-
lows from the IT-security guarantee and contractivity of
trace distance. The final line is exactly the homomorphic
property of the scheme for f ∈ Fn.
Thus, the probability of failure of the resulting QRAC
is at most (n). Recalling the assumption dim(HK) ≤
dim(HC), this gives the parameters of the claimed
QRAC. Applying Lemma 4, we see that dim(HC) +
dim(HE) ≥ log |S| − 2n · H((n)). Since dim(HC) +
dim(HE) is precisely the communication complexity of
the protocol as a whole, the Theorem follows.
It is worth noting that in the theorem, we only require
encryptions of classical bits to be secure, since we are
only concerned with classical functions. Even in the case
of hiding a constant fraction of information, setting Fn
to be the set of all Boolean functions on n bits, we obtain
Theorem 2 as a corollary.
Proof of Theorem 2. Because a QFHE scheme can imple-
ment the full set of Boolean functions, Theorem 6 gives
us that the communication complexity is lower bounded
by 2n(1 − H()), which is exponential in n whenever
 < 1.
More generally, one might expect that for most
information-theoretically secure schemes, realizing secu-
rity on the order of 2−poly(n) could be augmented to se-
curity on the order of O(2−1.01n) up to a polynomial
change in the function defining the security parameter.
For such a scheme, 2nH((n)) = o(1), giving us the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 7. Suppose we have a QHE scheme whose
permissible functions can be used to evaluate a set Fn
of n-bit Boolean functions. Further suppose that for any
pair of n-qubit ciphertexts ρ, ρ′, it satisfies
‖ρ− ρ′‖Tr ≤ (n)
for some (n) = O(2−1.01n). Then, its communication
complexity is lower bounded by log |S| − o(1).
Note that an identical argument will still give a
θ(log |Fn|) lower bound even if (n) = θ(2−n), assuming
|Fn| grows super-exponentially. However, we reiterate
that we would expect such schemes to be equivalent up
to polynomially related security parameters.
In comparing Theorem 6 to Theorem 1, we see that
Theorem 6 gives a nice generalization that matches the
dependency on the number of classical permissible func-
tions. Most importantly, by reducing to lower bounds in
quantum random access codes, it is robust to imperfect
IT-security. The mild tradeoff for this reduction is that
the lower bound is restricted to Boolean functions, rather
than general unitaries.
V. DISCUSSION
One thing that is of vital importance to notice: nei-
ther of these bounds rule out the possibility of IT-secure
leveled QFHE. Because the evaluation parameter is cho-
sen as a fixed polynomial of the input, leveled schemes
only carry the promise of implementing circuits whose
size is some polynomial in the input. A coarse count-
ing argument shows that the number of such circuits
can grow at most exponentially in the input size. These
information-theoretic approaches are ill-equipped to give
a super-polynomial lower bound, simply because the class
of permissible functions is too small.
6To this end, we might turn to complexity theory as
a means of proving no-go results. Aaronson et al. have
given complexity-theoretic evidence that perfectly-secure
QFHE is impossible if it takes the natural but restricted
form of an offline one-round generalized quantum encryp-
tion scheme [27]. Even so, we re-emphasize that this re-
laxation to imperfect security is non-trivial: for example
[27] shows that the delegation of blind quantum com-
putation by classical clients is highly unlikely, but there
already exist such schemes that leak a portion of the data
[31].
Although we have required perfect correctness
throughout for simplicity, the proofs go through using
generalizations of Nayak’s bound in the QPIR setting
that account for imperfect retrievals [10]. Furthermore,
it would be nice to generalize the lower bound to account
for unitary functions to fully generalize the result of [9].
As with any no-go result, the most interesting ques-
tion is how one might plausibly circumvent it. In this
direction, there are at least two avenues to consider.
The first is to lessen the stringency of the security even
further. We’ve seen that, when using a weaker security
guarantee in terms of accessible information, we can im-
plement a full continuum of permissible functions [19].
Could something similar be made universal, and if not,
how strong can this computational model be?
The second avenue to consider is to limit the number
of implementable functions. One could certainly restrict
oneself to exponentially large circuit classes, as several
existing IT-secure QHE schemes do. Perhaps more in-
terestingly, could one construct an efficient leveled QHE
scheme with meaningful IT-security guarantees, and if
so, what would such a scheme look like? In existing IT-
secure QHE schemes, for a fixed key size, information
about the underlying plaintext is leaked as you encrypt
more bits, but not as you apply more gates. It seems
that a leveled scheme would need to apply gates in such
a way that the gates themselves leak information about
the underlying plaintext; otherwise, the scheme might as
well be non-leveled. This idea is not without precedence,
since evaluation key gadgets that both carry information
about the secret key and apply gates homomorphically
are a cornerstone of computationally-secure QFHE [14].
Still, we reiterate that there is evidence that this can-
not be done in the perfect-security setting. In the direc-
tion of proving impossibility, perhaps further complexity-
theoretic bounds on the set of permissible functions can
be applied when restricting to a single-round of interac-
tion [27].
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